Here are my publications and some other stuff I’ve written or am writing. If you are interested in my current work or conference presentations, please email me.
The present century has seen renewed interest in characterizing cognition, the object of inquiry of the cognitive sciences. In this paper, I describe the problem of cognition—the absence of a positive characterization of cognition despite a felt need for one. It is widely recognized that the problem is motivated by decades of controversy among cognitive scientists over foundational questions, such as whether non-neural parts of the body or environment can realize cognitive processes, or whether plants and microbes have cognitive processes. The dominant strategy for addressing the problem of cognition is to seek a dichotomous criterion that vindicates some set of controversial claims. However, I argue that the problem of cognition is also motivated by ongoing conceptual development in cognitive science, and I describe four benefits that a characterization of cognition could confer. Given these benefits, I recommend an alternative criterion of success, ecumenical extensional adequacy, on which the aim is to describe the variation in expert judgments rather than to correct this variation by taking sides in sectarian disputes. I argue that if we had an ecumenical solution to the problem of cognition, we would have achieved much of what we should want from a “mark of the cognitive.”
2016. Cognition in Practice: Conceptual Development and Disagreement in Cognitive Science (PhD dissertation). University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy.
Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognitive processes extend outside the body, and whether plants have them. Previous work on this topic has aimed to settle these questions, but I ask instead how scientists could possibly disagree so much about such fundamental issues. I conclude that cognitive science is currently in a period of major conceptual change. I develop logical tools for characterizing concepts that, like cognition, are in transition, and argue for a novel view of cognitive science that has revisionary consequences for functionalism and our understanding of natural representation. While my dissertation focuses on issues in contemporary cognitive science, the tools I develop have promising applications in other scientific and social contexts.
2009. “The Precision of Locomotor Odometry in Humans.” (Authors: Frank H. Durgin, Mikio Akagi, Charles R. Gallistel and Woody Haiken). Experimental Brain Research 109: 429–436.
Two experiments measured the human ability to reproduce locomotor distances of 4.6–100 m without visual feedback and compared distance production with time production. Subjects were not permitted to count steps. It was found that the precision of human odometry follows Weber’s law that variability is proportional to distance. The coefficients of variation for distance production were much lower than those measured for time production for similar durations. Gait parameters recorded during the task (average step length and step frequency) were found to be even less variable suggesting that step integration could be the basis for non-visual human odometry.
2018. “Representation re-construed: Construal-based Norms for Ascribing Natural Representation.” Presented at the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice. Ghent, Belgium. 28 June. (Updated for the 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association; Seattle, Washington; 01–04 November.)
2014. “Going against the Grain: Functionalism and Generalization in Cognitive Science.” Presented at the 24th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Chicago, Illinois USA. 06 November.
Poster-designers are often interested in finding examples (especially in philosophy, where examples aren’t so common). I’ll post some of mine here.
2018. “Representation Re-construed: Answering the Job Description Challenge with a Construal-based Notion of Natural Representation.” Philosophy of Science Association. Seattle, Washington. 2 November.
2016. “Parameterization as a Framework for Modeling Contested Scientific Concepts.” Philosophy of Science Association. Atlanta, Georgia. 4 November.
2016. Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Austin, Texas. 1 June.
2014. “Laying down the Law: Substituting Mechanism for Functionalism.” Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Vancouver, British Columbia. 19 June.
Work in progress
These manuscripts are not public because they are either unfinished or under review. However, I’m happy to discuss them or provide drafts if asked.
Manuscript on the scientific concept of cognition. Under review (revise & resubmit).
Manuscript on methodology of conceptual explication. Under review.
Manuscript on representation-ascription.
Manuscript on computational functionalism.
Manuscript on phenomenal consciousness.
Functionalism and the Case for Modest Cognitive Extension. My MSc dissertation. Revision of 11 November, 2009.
In my MSc dissertation I attempt to disentangle certain prevalent confusions about the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) famously defended by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. In particular, I distinguish HEC from a related claim called the Hypothesis of Extended Mentality (HEM), and I distinguish Clark and Chalmers' arguments for each. I then articulate a successor to the parity argument for a modest version of HEC, and defend it against recent criticisms by Mark Sprevak and others.
Sellars on Functionalism and Normativity. Revision of 31 December, 2009.
In this essay I describe Wilfrid Sellars' functionalism and its applications to the metaphysics of cognition. I am particularly concerned to defend the views of the late Sellars from criticism by left-Sellarsians who allege that the late Sellars has succumbed to the myth of the given. Though the connections may not be apparent to others, it was returning to this essay as well as the presuppositions of my MSc dissertation (above) that yielded my PhD prospectus.
Speaking Truth to Power: Two Conceptions of Power in Plato's Gorgias. Revision of 02 February, 2014.
An interpretive essay in which I argue that in Gorgias Plato poses a puzzle about how to conceive of power: real power is efficacy, or it is understanding, but in most circumstances a person cannot be both efficacious and understanding. I suggest that while the puzzle is not resolved in Gorgias, Republic may describe a resolution that pleases Plato, but few modern readers.
The Structure of Hegelian Self-Consciousness: A Guide for the Perplexed. Revision of 26 January, 2012.
An admittedly ambitious (and long) paper describing my heterodox reading of the first division of Chapter IV of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Along the way I attempt to render some of the relevant Hegelian vocabulary into the slightly less obscure register of Anglophone philosophy. This paper requires some significant revisions, but it's strange enough that I thought there was no harm in offering it up here.