


Parameterization as a framework for modeling contested scientific concepts

Mikio Akagi
Texas Christian University

Contested concepts in science

Many scientific concepts are **contested** in that experts disagree about their proper use and extension. For example, biologists employ competing notions of **SPECIES**, **GENE**, and **NATURAL SELECTION**, and cognitive scientists disagree about the nature and extension of **COGNITION** and **REPRESENTATION**. We have several well-established strategies for modeling scientific and lay concepts—e.g. definitions for well-behaved classical concepts, homeostatic property clusters for vague concepts—we have few illuminating methods for modeling concepts whose extensions are contested in this way. I propose a method called **parameterization** for fruitfully modeling contested concepts.



Parameterization

Contested concepts exhibit a core of common practices for use (e.g. some inferences are always licit), but vary with respect to other rules of application. In parameterized explication, some terms are treated as **parameters** that can take various interpretations as values. Varying the interpretation of a parameter produces variations in the extension of the explicated term, thus modeling the diversity of ascriptions and inferential roles we find in scientific practice. A successful parameterization reveals both a core of common practices concerning the use of a term (in its unparameterized elements), as well as major topics of disagreement (in its parameterized elements). Categories represented by parameters are often ripe for further empirical or philosophical inquiry.

A linear equation with variables and parameters (in red):

$$y = mx + b$$

For example, the JTB account of knowledge draws wider assent than any more specific explication of its terms. I.e., most agree that JTB delivers correct verdicts in most cases although they do not agree how to ascribe **belief**, **truth**, or **justification**.

The JTB theory of truth:
Knowledge is **justified**, **true** belief.

Selection parameterized

The case of **NATURAL SELECTION** offers an example of relatively well-covered territory. Consider the following explication of selection, based on Richard Lewontin’s account:

Selection occurs where:

1. there is a population of **individuals**,
2. there is variation in the traits of those individuals,
3. possession of the traits is partly **heritable**,
4. variation in traits causes variation in individual **fitness**.

By accepting interpretations of the parameters that have different extensions, selectional phenomena can selectively include or exclude boundary cases. The parameterized account makes explicit the dimensions of flexibility in the concept of **SELECTION** that enable its generalizability to novel contexts.



	natural selection	artificial selection	cultural evolution	evolutionary algorithm
individual	Darwinian individual	Darwinian individual	cultural artifact (meme)	candidate problem solution
heritable	e.g. germ-line transmission	e.g. germ-line transmission	reproduction by/in humans	conservation of components
fitness	no. successful offspring in natural conditions	no. successful offspring selected by breeder	no. offspring in culture	no. offspring after selection by fitness function





Cognition parameterized

The scientific concept of **COGNITION** is not as well-understood, and there are ongoing disputes about its extension. Extant debates tend to turn on how to interpret “**representation**,” glossing over other issues. The following explication models most of variance in scientists’ judgments:

Cognition is the operation of mechanisms, where

1. the mechanisms **belong to a subject**,
2. the mechanisms **represent** the subject’s environment, and
3. the mechanisms **manage the behavior** of the subject.

If the explication above is adequate to the variation in scientific judgments about the extension of **COGNITION**, it suggests that further philosophical attention of the nature of **cognitive subjects** and **behavior** is warranted.

				
	face perception	extended memory	embodied audition	tomato- seeking
belong to subject	parts of biological organism	mechanisms serving organism	parts of biological organism	parts of biological organism
represent	representations with NDC	representations	adaptive mechanisms	pushmi-pullyu representations
manage behavior	autonomous locomotion, articulation	autonomous locomotion, articulation	autonomous locomotion, articulation	autonomous locomotion incl. plant activity

Conclusion

Parameterization offers a perspicuous method of representation for contested concepts, reflecting understanding of scientific disagreement.

Selected literature

Boyd, Richard N. 1999. “Kinds, Complexity, and Multiple Realization.” *Philosophical Studies* 95: 67–98.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2009. *Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection*. Oxford: OUP.
Kanwisher, N. & G. Yovel. 2006. “The Fusiform Face Area...” *Phil. Trans. Royal Society B* 361: 2109–2128.
Lewontin, Richard C. 1970. “The Units of Selection.” *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 1: 1–18.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1995. “Pushmi-pullyu Representations.” *Philosophical Perspectives* 9: 185–200.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Robert Brandom, Edouard Machery, Joseph McCaffrey, and others for comments and criticism. This work was supported by the University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy, the Office of the Provost, and the Wesley C. Salmon Fund.

Contact

Mikio Akagi, Assistant Professor the History and Philosophy of Science
John V. Roach Honors College, Texas Christian University
Email: m.akagi@tcu.edu
Website: www.mikioakagi.net



JOHN V. ROACH
HONORS COLLEGE

