Papers, posters, and manuscripts
Here are my publications and some other stuff I’ve written or am writing. If you are interested in my current work or conference presentations, feel free to email me.
Peer-reviewed journal articles
2019. Phenomenality, conscious states, and consciousness inessentialism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Online first. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-019-09633-6.
2009. The precision of locomotor odometry in humans. (Authors: Frank H. Durgin, Mikio Akagi, Charles R. Gallistel and Woody Haiken). Experimental Brain Research 109: 429–436.
Book reviews and critical commentary
2019. Finding the bounds of Machery’s critique. Critical discussion of Edouard Machery, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (OUP, 2017). International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Online first. DOI: 10.1080/09672559.2019.1655945.
See the rest of the symposium:
Hughes, Nick. Disagreement, dogmatism, and the bounds of philosophy.
Springle, Alison. The method of cases in context.
Machery, Edouard. Response to Akagi, Hughes, and Springle.
2019. Review of Ruth Garrett Millikan, Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information (OUP, 2017). Philosophical Quarterly. Online first. DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqz013.
2016. Cognition in Practice: Conceptual Development and Disagreement in Cognitive Science (PhD dissertation). University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy.
2009. Functionalism and the Case for Modest Cognitive Extension (MSc dissertation). University of Edinburgh School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences. Revision of 11 November, 2009.
2018. Representation re-construed: Construal-based norms for ascribing natural representation. Presented at the Seventh Biennial Meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice. Ghent, Belgium. 28 June. (Updated for the 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association; Seattle, Washington; 01–04 November.)
2014. Going against the grain: Functionalism and generalization in cognitive science. Presented at the 24th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Chicago, Illinois USA. 06 November.
Work in progress
These manuscripts are either unfinished or under review, so I am not making them public and I have redacted their titles here. However, I’m happy to discuss them or provide drafts if asked.
Manuscript on the scientific concept of cognition. Under review (revise & resubmit).
Manuscript on methodology of conceptual explication. Under review.
Manuscript on microaggressions (with Frederick W. Gooding, Jr.).
Manuscript on representation-ascription.
Manuscript on computational functionalism.
First-time designers of research posters are often interested in finding examples (especially in philosophy, where posters aren’t very common yet). I’ll post some of mine here.
2018. Representation re-construed: Answering the job description challenge with a construal-based notion of natural representation. Philosophy of Science Association. Seattle, Washington. 2 November.
2016. Parameterization as a framework for modeling contested scientific concepts. Philosophy of Science Association. Atlanta, Georgia. 4 November.
2016. Cognition as the sensitive management of organismal behavior. Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Austin, Texas. 1 June.
2014. Laying down the law: Substituting mechanism for functionalism. Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Vancouver, British Columbia. 19 June.
I don’t see myself getting these papers published, but I like them so they’re down here.
Sellars on functionalism and normativity. Revision of 31 December, 2009.
In this essay I describe Wilfrid Sellars' functionalism and its applications to the metaphysics of cognition. I am particularly concerned to defend the views of the late Sellars from criticism by left-Sellarsians who allege that the late Sellars has succumbed to the myth of the given. Though the connections may not be apparent to others, it was returning to this essay as well as the presuppositions of my MSc dissertation (above) that inspired my PhD dissertation.
Speaking truth to power: Two conceptions of power in Plato's Gorgias. Revision of 02 February, 2014.
An interpretive essay in which I argue that in Gorgias Plato poses a puzzle about how to conceive of power: real power is efficacy, or it is understanding, but in most circumstances a person cannot be both efficacious and understanding. I suggest that while the puzzle is not resolved in Gorgias, Republic may describe a resolution that pleases Plato, but few modern readers.
The structure of Hegelian self-consciousness: A guide for the perplexed. Revision of 26 January, 2012.
An admittedly ambitious (and long) paper describing my heterodox reading of the first division of Chapter IV of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Along the way I attempt to render some of the relevant Hegelian vocabulary into the slightly less obscure register of Anglophone philosophy. This paper requires some significant revisions, but it's strange enough that I thought there was no harm in offering it up here.